

~~TOP SECRET~~

20 October 1964

25X1

Copy No. C 22 - 12

25X1



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

25X1

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page Denied

25X1

20 October 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. USSR: Brezhnev's first public pronouncement.
(Page 1)

25X1

3. South Vietnam: Security conditions in northern-most provinces continue to deteriorate. (Page 4)

4. Laos: Military situation uneasy after brief flare-up in central Laos. (Page 5)

25X1

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 October 1964

DAILY BRIEF

*USSR: Brezhnev used his first public speech as party leader to reassure the Soviet people of the new regime's dedication to policy lines worked out since Stalin's death.

Delivering the main address at yesterday's ceremonies honoring the Voskhod cosmonauts--a role Khrushchev clearly had expected to play--Brezhnev promised that the party's prime task will be to improve the welfare of the people and to develop "socialist democracy" in every way.

Brezhnev also took this occasion to indicate there will be no change in Moscow's basic attitude toward the Chinese Communists. He repeated Pravda's 17 October statement that the Soviet party will "actively work" for a conference of all Communist parties--a meeting which Peiping insists should not be held for at least four or five years. He also reaffirmed Soviet foreign policy positions long attacked by Peiping and claimed that the peaceful co-existence line is "supported by all honest people on earth." In a similar vein Pravda underlined Soviet "irreconcilability to any forms of opportunism."

Although Brezhnev did not refer to the preparatory meeting proposed for mid-December, Pravda on 17 October reported resolutions by the French and Italian parties endorsing this meeting and Moscow radio noted yesterday that the Finnish party has elected representatives to both this meeting and the full conference proposed for mid-1965.

(continued)

25X1

While Khrushchev's removal would make it easier in some ways to postpone the December meeting and tone down polemics the fact remains that the new leaders have been closely identified with Khrushchev's China policy and it would not be easy for them to disclaim responsibility for it.

The US Embassy in Moscow cautions against assuming that the Brezhnev-Kosygin duumvirate is a stable arrangement. Although Brezhnev as first secretary is in the strongest position to perpetuate his power, the ambitions and views of other leaders will eventually break the calm of the present "collective leadership." The embassy feels that signs of jockeying for position may soon become apparent.

The role of Podgorny is particularly unclear. For a time he was the most obvious of Khrushchev's favorites. Unless he falls in the wake of Khrushchev's ouster he may represent a curb or even a threat to Brezhnev's power in the future. Similarly, other leaders, some of a younger generation, are undoubtedly waiting their chances.

There is little reason, moreover, to assume that Kosygin and Brezhnev can work harmoniously together. Any attempt by either to improve his position would likely inaugurate a struggle for power as bitter and uncompromising as that which followed the death of Stalin.

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

25X1



Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007900420001-8

25X1

*South Vietnam: Security conditions in the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam have continued to deteriorate.

According to the US military commander, General Westmoreland, Viet Cong-initiated incidents in the I Corps area increased 66 percent in the third quarter of 1964. This compares with a country-wide increase of 34 percent. Profiting in part from unsettled political conditions, the Communists have extended their control eastward from the mountains into the foothills and are in a position to threaten the populated coastal plains. The coastal highway is now sabotaged daily.

Government pacification programs which were showing progress in April have suffered reverses. The adverse trend is most evident in Quang Tin and Quang Nam provinces, but is also considered serious in the two other provinces in the command.

General Westmoreland believes that, since there has been no thinning of government forces in the I Corps area, the stepped-up Viet Cong activity reflects substantial infiltration from North Vietnam. He is concerned that the Viet Cong are gaining increased access to manpower and food resources along the coast, and may try to establish beachheads to support more extensive infiltration from the sea.

25X1

20 Oct 64


DAILY BRIEF

4

25X1

LAOS

25X1



25X1

Laos: The military situation has returned to an uneasy quiet following a brief flare-up in the Thakhek region of central Laos.

Rightist forces have moved to reinforce positions west of Ban Khen, where a government battalion was attacked on 15 October. In addition, Laotian Air Force planes have flown several strike missions against suspected enemy positions in the area.

25X1

In the Plaine des Jarres area, the opposing forces are continuing to consolidate their positions in the Phou Kout region. Government roadwatch teams have reported that more than 200 trucks, some carrying troops and supplies, moved west along Route 7 toward the Plaine between 13 and 16 October.

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

CONFIDENTIAL

THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

- Special Counsel to the President
- The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
- The Scientific Adviser to the President
- The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

- The Secretary of State
- The Under Secretary of State
- The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
- The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

- The Secretary of the Treasury
- The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

- The Secretary of Defense
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Secretary of the Army
- The Secretary of the Navy
- The Secretary of the Air Force
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense
- The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
- Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
- Chief of Staff, United States Army
- Commandant, United States Marine Corps
- U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
- Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
- Commander in Chief, Pacific
- Commander in Chief, Atlantic
- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- The Director, The Joint Staff
- The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
- The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
- The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

- The Attorney General
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation
- The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

- The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

- The Chairman

The National Security Agency

- The Director

The United States Information Agency

- The Director

The National Indications Center

- The Director

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET